A lengthy dispute, which for almost fıfty years picthed the Em pire to the United States, is a patent instance of the failure of Ottoman diplomacy to assert its legitimate rights in the face of a cynical manifestation of Great Power Realpolitik. Though the dispute was largely, as an American diplomat involved has said, of an "academic " nature, it acquires a different stature when placed in the context of the post-Tanzimat Ottoman statesmen's aspirations to free the Empire from the shackles of the capitulations. A thorough sLudy of this controversy which occupied a succession of Ottoman diplomats both at the Washington legation (which was raised to embassy level in 1910) and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in istanbul also sheds light on the inner workings of the ministry. 1 Indeed, not only does one see the mechanism of the ministry at v^ork, but one can also detect personal rivalries and offıce feuds in betvveen the lines of the dispatehes that went to and fro the legation and the ministry.
The dispute had its origin in the wording of Article 4 of the Turco-American Treaty signed in the Ottoman capital on May 7, 1830, which is the starting point of regular diplomatic relations between the two countries. The story of the negotiations that led to tltıe conclusion of this treaty is well known and will not be dwelt upon here. We have to know that till the 1856 Paris Conference where the Empire was admitted into the European Concert, v/henever the Ottoman Empire concluded treaties with foreign İThis article is based on files HR/H232-233-234 from the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri containing the correspondence exchanged betvveen the Ottoman mission in Washington and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs över this issue. I hope to return to this subject in more detail in a forthcoming study of Ottoman diplomatic history.
powers, it acccptcd only the Turkish version of the tcxt as binding and valid. It would appear that articlc 4 of the American trcaty, conccrning penal matters related to American subjccts residing and working in the Empire, was poorly drafted in its Turkish original and was therefore open to misinterpretations. Capitulatory rights provided that in causes where both partics were foreigners, these causes were to be heard by the consuls of the countries whose subjects the partics involved were. However mixed cascs, that is whcn one party was an Oltoman subjcct and the other a forcigncr, would fail under Ottoman jurisdietion, with the consul or the dragoman of the foreign party being admittcd as an observer. Article 4 of the Turco-American trcaty was drafted in the Turkish version in such a careless way that it could bc construed that mixcd cases were also to bc heard by Amcrican consuls to the cxclusion of Turkish courts, that is it was giving American subjccts the right of extcrritorialily in ali but in name.
This goes a long way to show how inept had the preTanzimât Ottoman Chanccry grown that it could ovcrlook such a gross error, which gave away the last remnants of national sovereignty, that is the right to try and punish foreign nationals. American.diplomats realized the importance of this clause early on, which they had sccurcd vvithout even asking for it. The Ariıcrican negotiators had been instructcd to obtain the trcatment of the mostfavoured nation, and here they had unwitlingly obtaincd from the Porte a concession that even countries long-cstablished in the Levant like France, England and Austria had not been able to gain for their own nationals. That the Ottoman statesmen, on the other hand, failed to apprehend the dangers that this faulty composition could lead to is clear as the samc clause appears verbatim in two other treaties the Porte negotiated with foreign states in subscqucnt years, that is in the Belgian trcaty of 1838 and the Portuguese treaty of 1843. Legislation comparee, Bruxelles, 2e serie, 1906, tome VIII, pp. 3-19. too much publicity to the whole affair and decided to expel ali the foreigners who had becn involved in this botched up attempt to overthrow the Khedive. But this did not prevent a lengthy exchange of notes between the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American legation on the subject of Article 4. I have not been able so far to trace either these notes or any document related to the Mustafa Fazıl Paşa expedition in the Ottoman archives. But it would appear that Ali Paşa's last note to the legation on the matter of Article 4 dated 18 September 1869 having remained unanswered, the Porte interpreted this as an acceptance on the part of the US Government of its views on the issue, and the matter was allowed to fail into oblivion.
Ten years later, an event was to occur that would bring it back to the fore of Turco-American relations and open a file which remained active for almost 40 years. Indeed, in February 1877, a drunken sailor called Patrick Kelly from the crew of USS Vandala, a ship from the American Mediterranean station which was anchored at the port of İzmir, killed Tahir Ağa, a customs watchman. The sailor was taken into custody by the Ottoman poliçe but later was handed över to the American consul in İzmir, on the condition that the consul would arrange for him to appear at court when the case was to be heard. It was the understanding of the Governor of the Aydın Province, Sabri Paşa, with whom Consul Smithers was in touch över this affair, that when Kelly was to be summoned to the court, the consul or his dragoman would be present only as a witness to the proceedings, as was the case in law suits in which a foreigner was one of the parties. However, Smithers demanded the right for himself to sit among the judges who would hear the case with a deliberative vote. He was basing his claim on article 42 of the English capitulations of 1645 and cited precedents in which the British consul in İzmir had in recent years been allowed to take part in the deliberations of the court in mixed cases involving British subjects. The governor having dismissed Smithers' dem and on the ground that this article had become obsolete and disclaiming any knowledge of such a permission having recently been granted to the British consul, the US consul acting on instructions received from the Consul General in İstanbul, Schuyler, released the sailor and allowed him to leave İzmir with USS Vandala.
The Turkish government wcre rightly incensed. Not only had a culprit escaped scot-frec from the pursuit of Ottoman law, but once more foreign consuls wcre taking the law into their own hands and were exceeding their rights. Consul Schuyler had already been a cause of irritation for the Porte when his reports on Bulgaria had been given wide publicity in the press both in Europe and in the States. As the US Minister in İstanbul, Maynard endorsed the action of his consuls and dcclared categorically that Article 4 of the 1830 treaty granted US consular officers the right to judge American citizens in ali kinds of cases, the Ottoman Government decided to settle this matter once for ali and invited the American Government to negotiations on this issue. If one bears in mind the events that wcre taking placc in the summer of 1877, one can easily realize the importance the Porte was giving this matter. After an inconclusive cxchange of notes betwcen the legation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Department suggestcd that the venue for the negotiations be moved to Washington. This was to be the first instancc of the dilatory tactics used by the American government in this long-drawn case. Whenever they appearcd at loss for new arguments, they would switch the centre of the talks from one capital to the other. The American side proved itself an adept of old-style great-powerdiplomacy: stick it out until your opponent gets bored and loses interest.
But in this precise case, their opponents did not lose interest. Too much was at stake for the Ottomans. They had started a fıght to abolish the capitulations or at least to revise those that were contrary to national sovereignty and were striving to place the Empire's relations with foreign states within the frame of international law and reciprocity, this last concept becoming the key word for Ottoman diplomats. They could therefore ill-afford to grant a power, that had not much wcight in the region, new privileges which they would be forccd to likevvise extend to ali other states as the trcaties they had contracted were based on the "most favoured nation" principlc. And this accounts for the attention the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoted to the matter at a time when the Empire was fighting first a vital war against Russia and then was involved in crucial post-war negotiations.
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The main actors on the Ottoman end were on the one hand the successive envoys in Washington and on the other the Legal Advisors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in İstanbul or the Chambre des Conseillers Legistes de la Porte as was their title in Frcnch, which had, after the Crimean War become the offıcial working language of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. Över the 35 years that the dispute lasted , some nine envoys succeedcd one another at the head of the Washington mission which was raised to Embassy level in 1912, but two played an important role in the course of the negotiations; Gregory Aristarchi Bey and Alcxandre Mavroyeni Bey. That these two both belonged to the Grcck Orthodox millet is a sheer coincidcnce. Aristarchi was en poste in Washington whcn the whole matter started and Mavroyeni served in Washington for almost ten years. So out of the 35 years that the dispute lasted these two men werc on the spot for an aggrcgate of almost 16 years. And for the remaining twenty years, this question, though unsolved, was allowed to remain dormant, with occasional outbursts of activity when the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs would ask its envoy in Washington to sound the State Department in this rcspcct and it would either receive an umpteenth repetition of the US standpoint or the request would simply remain unanswered. A sign of the importance the Sublime Porte attached to finding a solution to this issue is indicated by the decision to canccl in 1880 a Council of State motion to elose the Washington legation for budgetary reasons. It was felt that kceping a dircct öpen linç to the Department of State would greatly justify the expense involved.
Aristarchi Bey who opened the negotiations in Washington is also known as the compiler of the 7-volumc collection of Ottoman laws and regulations translatcd into Frcnch. He left Washington in March 1883 having served therc över ten years. His recall seems to have been caused by a Palace cabale related to the purehase by the Ottoman Army of US-made riflcs. He then lived in self-imposed exilc in Paris, where he was in the employment of Alfred Nobel for whom he acted as a kind of intcrnational affairs advisor. After the fail of Abdülhamid II, he was rcinstated as Ottoman Minister to the Netherlands where he died in 1915, the last serving senior Ottoman diplomat from the Greek millet. He is to a large part the originator of the main arguments used by the Ottoman side in this dispute.
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Mavroyeni Bey who ended his diplomatic career as the Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna on the eve of the Balkan Wars appears to have been an independent spirit, delighted in initiating schemes for which he would later try to obtain official endorsement. In the question that is of interest to us many have been the times when he did devise proposals to submit to the Department of State and for which he literally begged approval from İstanbul. While in Vienna in 1911, he came up with an audacious proposal for an Ottoman-Austrian alliance against the Slaves in south-east Europe.
At the homefront, that is at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in istanbul, policies were formulated by the Office of the Legal Advisors, which was headed at the beginning by the German Genscher assisted by Gabriel Noradonghian, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs and the author of the celebrated collection of treaties of the Ottoman Empire. The role of the Legal Advisors appears to have been to try to dampen the more sanguine ardour of the men at the frontline and, so to speak, to bring them to a more realistic reading of the situation. But they were nevertheless careful not to keep them too strictly under control, rcady to share in the credit if they were successful but equally ready to disavow them if they failed.
From the start Ottoman diplomats were careful to set apart two different issues; the case of Patrick Kelly accused of homicide and the question of the interpretation given by the Americans to Article 4. Aristarchi set himself upon these two tasks with great relish. The Kelly question was relatively easy to solve. He was a fugitive from Turkish justice and his offence had been clearly established. The Americans refused to release him back to an Ottoman court to be tried on the ground that that court was not habilitated to judge him; but on the other hand they were not willing to hand him över to an American court, and what is more he had been reported to have come back to İzmir several times after the event whenever his ship the Vandala called at the port. Aristarchi arranged for ali the notes exchanged between Consul Smithers and Governor Sabri Paşa to be sent to him in Washington and he was able to clearly establish that Smithers had violated the existing usages by refusing to release Kelly back to Ottoman poliçe and that Minister Morris at İstanbul had several times misled the Ottoman Foreign Ministry either deliberately or because he himself had been misinformed by his subordinates, Smithers in İzmir and Schuyler in İstanbul.
The Ottoman envoy realiscd that the likelihood of the Americans ever giving up Kelly to the Ottoman authorities was very remote and that the Ottoman state could not initiate an extradition case against Kelly on the grounds that a) there was no extradition treaty between the USA and the Empire since the 1874 Naturalisation Treaty betvveen the two countries had been allowed to lapse and b) because, in any case, such treaties provided only for criminals convicted of premeditated murder to be extradited and not authors of homicides. Furthermore, extradition cases fought in American courts were both costly and lengthy affairs. Aristarchi, thus based ali his argumentation on the fact that a erime, albeit unpremeditated and accidental, was allowed to remain unpunished and that the family of the murdered man had fallen into distress by the action of an American subject. He managed to obtain a monetary compensation in favour of the family in spite of much foot dragging on the part of the Department of State which tried to make the payment of an indemnity conditional to the acceptance by the Porte of the American interpretation of Article 4. He was finally given a draft of USD 1200 drawn on an American bank in Paris which he at once triumphantly fonvarded to İstanbul. Whether this sum ever reached Tahir's widow and children is a moot point that will probably never be solved. As an additional reparation, the two consuls who had been involved in this affair, Smithers in İzmir and Schuyler in the capital, were shortly after recalled.
The matter of Article 4 was approached at different levels by Ottoman diplomacy. It was fırst claimed that the translation was at fault. The matter was complicated by the fact that the Turkish original had been translated fırst into French and from that into English. The fırst üne of attack of Ottoman diplomacy was to get the Americans to only accept the validity of the Turkish original.
The State Department challenged the Porte to produce its own version of the original which the Porte proved to be reluctant to do for a long time. This reluctance was ali the more diffîcult to urıderstand that by that time two published editions of the Ottoman version had alrcady appcared and were available to serutiny, the first one dating back to 1842. 4 When finally a manuseript version of the original text was found, it became clear to the dismay of Ottoman diplomats that the said text was at best ambiguous and at worse could possibly lend itself to an interpretation elose to the one pııt forward by the Americans. At once a new linç of defense was devised, which, whilc admitting that the text was unclear, was based on the part of the article that said that the procedure in case involving Americans would "follow in this respect the usage observed towards other Franks". The usage in this respect was quite clear: none of the European powers that had many more subjects settlcd in the Ottoman Empire had tried to avail itself of such a privilege. When the State Department answercd that such a right had been granted to the US by the treaty, Aristarchi and his successors meticulously studied the published American diplomatic documents relative to the negotiations and conclusively proved that what the American negotiators had as bricf was to obtain the treatment of the most favourcd nation, and had they secured a privilege likely to radically ehange the whole status of foreigners in the Empire, a trace of such a spectacular achievement would have been found in their dispatehes to Washington. The Department of State under a number of administrations both Republican and Democrat stuck to its position claiming that as the Treaty in this form had been ratified by Congrcss and had been published in congressional rccords, it had acquired the character of a US statutory law and could only be modified by a decision of the Congress itself.
In the face of US obduracy, Ottoman diplomats kept looking for a varicty of ways to influence the State Department, somc of tlıcm quite innovativc. During the Patrick Kelly affair, and while the first Ottoman Parliamcnt was stili in sessioh, Aristarchi proposed that a dcputy for the İzmir provincc ask a parliamentary question to the Ottoman Ministcr of Foreign Affairs which would result in the publication of ali the documents related to this case in the hopc that this publication would wakc American public opinion to the inequity of their rcprescntatives in Turkey. This is indicativc of the realisation by Ottoman diplomats of a) the working of a parliamentary state and b) the importance of public opinion. The question never came to the agenda of the Ottoman parliament for obvious rcasons, but attempts to influcnce American policy makers through public opinion continued. The Legal Advisors' Office publishcd a 40-page pamphlet in Frcnch stating the posilion of the Porte in this issue. Hüseyin Tevfik Paşa, then Ottoman minister in Washington arranged it to be translated into English and distributed 150 copies among leading Congressmen and journalists. He also tried to have articlcs favourable to the Turkish view published in American papers but had to give up when journalists demanded to be paid. Not only had he no budget for that but he had been most imperatively instructed not to disburse a penny for this.
Stili there where somc attempts to influcnce the Congress notably through the Democrat senatör for New York Samucl Cox, who bricfly served as the US Minister to the Ottoman Empire and wcnt on rccord for declaring at a Congressional session that the capitulations regime was outmodcd and iniquitous. Another Ottoman minister, Ali Ferruh Bey, was heard for a whole aftcrnoon by the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senatc. Ottoman diplomats werc on the lookout for cascs of a similar nature whcre the US had yielded to a foreign powcr and wcrc dclightcd to find out that the US had admitted to a translation error in a trcaty with Spain. In another case which had opposcd the US to Britain, the US position was eloser to the Ottoman one in the Turco-American dispute. Whcn the US President publicly acknowledged that the United States had behave unjustly tovvards the Republic of Hawaii and presented his apologies, this lcd to optimistic assessments on the part of the Ottoman Minister.
Among the various avenues cxplored by Ottoman diplomats the following are the most imaginative: recourse to arbitration though this was judged as potentially dangerous since the possibility of an unfavourablc judgement being passed was not rulcd out ovving to the hostility gcnerally cxhibiled lovvards the Empire. One of the arbiters suggcsted was the Papal nuncio in İstanbul. The unilateral denunciation of the whole treaty or of Article 4 only was also suggested. Even the forceful arrest of Americans accused of crimes was contemplated by the more aıudacious of Ottoman diplomats oblivious of the possible outcry such an action might evoke. It is rather ironical that Ottoman diplomacy was even concerned at one time with trying to save the face of the State Department and suggested that the matter be solved by an exchange of notes betvveen the American mission in İstanbul and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or alternatively between the Ottoman Legation and the Department of State, notes that would clarify the spiril of Article 4 hopefully in accordance with the Ottoman interpretation. This would have had the advantage of not requiring the assent of the Congress. The State Department again rejected this proposal insisting on its own interpretation of both the letter and the spirit of the Article 4.
The discussion remained largely on academic lcvel as said carlier. I have not been able to establish the number of Americans who had been involved in such cases and who were able to escape judgment and punishment in Ottoman courts through the action of US consulates. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to have handed such a list to the American Embassy in 1910 but it was obviously not a very large one. Yet there was always the possibility that the number would increase if former Ottoman subjects returned to the Empire having acquired American nationality and became embroiled in such cases. The Porte did not acknowledge this change of nationality since the 1869 Law of Nationality provided that Ottomans who wanted to change their nationality had beforchand to secure the Porte's consent and pledge not to return to Ottoman lands under their new nationality. The US were the only power not to recognize this pre-condition which resulted in the absence of a naturalisation treaty between the two countries, and as a matter of fact most of the American subjects involved in court cases were freshly naturalized former Ottoman subjects.
Ottoman diplomats involved in this matter, including those who belonged to the Greek Orthodox Millet were painfully avvare of the negative impact that the missionary lobby had on the politics of Washington. Aristarchi, referring to the author of an offıcial report on the Capitulations, a junior offıcial of the American consulate at Cairo, Van Dyke, was quick to note that he was the son of a missionary family and that this gave him a biased view. Ali Ferruh Bey, answering a request from the ministry to bring the matter once more to the attention of the Department of State stated that the time was not opportune referring to the anti-Turkish campaign orchestrated in the wake of the events in eastern Anatolia by the President of the University of Michigan, Angell who, while he served briefly as American Minister, had proposed that the US Navy "should rattle the Sultan's windows". Ali Ferruh called him disparagingly in his dispatch "ce cure Angell". Ottoman diplomats were also worried about the wayward actions of American consuls trying to preserve American subjects from Ottoman justice. The memory of Consul Vidal who had threaten to bombard Tripoli if his demands were not met stili rankled.
After the restoration of the Constitution in 1908, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again approached the US with the view of settling fınally this affair. The Americans this time answered sanctimoniously that though they acknovvledged that now the Constitution provided protection against arbitrary power, they were concerned about the state of Ottoman prisons and until there was a notable improvement they would not let Turkish justice imprison any American (Ottoman diplomats en poste in Washington regularly referred to the expeditious way in which justice was meted out in the US and gleefully reported cases of lynching and public hanging). Sometime later Rıfat Paşa, the Foreign Minister drew the attention of the American government to the fact the new regime was about to embark on wide infrastructural investments and that American bidders vvould most likely be turned down since these investments required also the presence of a large foreign workforce and that ovving to the lack of understanding between the two countries över the penal condition of Americans, it was not to be desired that Americans should reşide in large numbers in the Empire. And indeed, as soon as the prospect of a railvvay concession to be granted to an American consortium headed by Admiral Chester came to the agenda and that the Ottoman government made it clear that the granting of the concession would be made conditional to the US accepting the Ottoman interpretation of Article 4, ali the qualms of the State Department miraculously disappeared. the Ottomans demanded that the matter be settled by an exchange of notes according to their terms to which the Americans agreed. As an amusing aside, the Ottomans wcre represented by two Armenians, Ohannes Kuyumciyan, the under-secretary of the Foreign Ministry and Hrand Abro, a legal advisor while America was also represented by an Armenian, Schmavonian the legal counselor of the Embassy.
A short time after the agrccment was reached, a scrics of external factors intervened to render it inconsequential. But the stııdy of how it was reached will remain as a instruetive case-study of cthics and morality in the conduct of foreign policy.
One can but conjecture on the reasons why successive US administrations chose to stick to a position whereby they may have been right in the letter but in vvhich they were defınitely in their wrong according to the spirit, and as confirmed by the leading contemporary authority on the capitulations the Frenchman Pdlissiö du Rausas, specially whcn they wcre to bcat such an ignominious retreat from that position as soon as the higher inl;erest of the country were at stake.
